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NOTES AND COMMENTS

put on the definition of customer lists and knowledge as trade secrets
is unknown. A prior confidential relationship would probably be
required. If a narrow view of the dictum in the Kadis case is taken,
it may be indicative that North Carolina would be reluctant to
restrain competitive solicitation where the former employee relies
upon memory alone though the door is left open where the names
remembered were acquired and used in breach of trust. It should
be remembered that there is substantial case authority in other jurisdictions approving the rule that lists remembered are likewise protectable.
DAVID M. CONNOR

Trusts-Rule Against Perpetuities-Class Gifts
In Parker v. Parker1 a testator devised certain property to his
son in trust, the rents and profits therefrom to be used for the education of the son's children in such amounts as the trustee in his
discretion deemed necessary. The trustee was directed to convey
the property to the grandchildren (or grandchild) or to the issue
of any deceased grandchild "when" the youngest grandchild reached
twenty-eight. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
latter provision violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
In North Carolina the Rule Against Perpetuities has been
stated as follows: "No devise or grant of a future interest in property
is valid unless title thereto must vest, if at all, not later than twentyone years, plus the period of gestation, after some life or lives in
being at the time of the creation of the interest."' The effect of the
a contract in its true sense is not sought. Prevention of unfair competition
is the reason for seeking equitable interference." This statute should be applicable only to express agreements between the parties, not to what the law
implicitly recognizes as unfair competition. The parties can agree to reasonably limit the employee from competing if such agreement is reduced to
writing and signed by the employee. But the master-servant or agency relationship found in the cases discussed does not limit the employee's right to
compete, but merely the methods that he may use.
1252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960).
Id. at 402, 113 S.E.2d at 902. The North Carolina court often has
incorrectly stated that the interest must vest in not less than twenty-one
years. This has not, however, affected any of the decisions. See Finch v.
Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957); McPherson v. First Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 80 S.E.2d 386 (1954); Fuller v. Hedgpeth, 239
N.C. 370, 80 S.E.2d 18 (1954) ; McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,
234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952). The rule is properly stated in the
principal case and 'also in Clarke v. Clarke, 253 N.C. 156, 116 S.E.2d 449
(1960).
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rule is to prescribe the time within which an interest must vest;8

thus the rule will affect only contingent interests. 4 The rule is not
concerned with the postponement of possession,5 with accumulation,'
with suspension of alienation,7 or with duration.' However, the
rule may not be evaded by the creation of a private trust.0 It
applies to the time when the legal interest vests in the trustee, as well
as to the time when the equitable or beneficial interest vests in the
beneficiary."0
The problems presented in the Parker case are of particular
importance to the practicing attorney in that there is an increasing
number of persons who wish to provide in their wills for the establishment of a trust giving the trustee some discretion in the use of
the income in case of unforeseen circumstances and providing for the
distribution of the corpus when the beneficiary attains such age as
the testator thinks necessary for him to be able to intelligently
manage his own affairs. If we assume that such testamentary disposition is a good one and that the testator's intention should be
carried out, it would seem that the gift in the principal case could
have been saved without doing violence to present North Carolina
law.
In order to hold the gift valid in the principal case the court
would have to consider three problems: (1) Is the membership in
'McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., supra note 2.
'Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960).
'Fuller v. Hedgpeth, 239 N.C. 370, 80 S.E.2d 18 (1954). See generally
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 513 (2d ed. 1947).
'Goldtree v. Thompson, 79 Cal. 613, 22 Pac. 50 (1889).
Manierre v. Welling, 32 RI. 104, 78 Atl. 507 (1911). See generally 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.2 (Casner ed. 1952).
8 Seaver v. Fitzgerald, 141 Mass. 401, 6 N.E. 73 (1886);

McQueen v.
Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952). See

generally GRAY, Tin RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 205 (4th ed. 1942);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 370 (1944); 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTEREST § 500

(1936). But see American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46
S.E.2d 104 (1948), where the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that
the rule limits the duration of private trusts. This statement was repudiated
in McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., supra. However, language

used by the court in Finch v. Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957),
discussed in 36 N.C.L. REv. 467 (1958), may reopen the possibility that
a private trust might be held invalid because full enjoyment is postponed for
an excessive period of time.
' McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., supra note 8; American
Trust Co. v. Williamson, supra note 8. For a discussion of the effect of the
rule on charitable trusts, see 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 352
(1935).
" McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831
(1952).
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the class of grandchildren ascertainable within the period of the
Rule Against Perpetuities? (2) Do the gifts to the grandchildren
vest within the period of the rule? (3) Are the gifts to the issue
of any deceased grandchild (or grandchildren) valid and if not, what
effect does this have on the gift to the grandchildren?
As to the first of these problems, the court interpreted the will
to mean that all the children of the testator's son, including such
children as might be born after the testator's death, were to be
included in the gift. The court then concluded that the class membership was not ascertainable until the termination of the trust. In
so deciding, however, the court failed to consider the grandchildren
as a class separate and distinct from the issue. If the court had
made this distinction, there is respectable authority for holding the
gift valid.
Such a distinction was made in Hill v. Birmingham." In this
case the will establishing the trust provided that the income therefrom was to be used in equal shares for the benefit of the testator's
grandchildren as the trustee, in his discretion, might deem proper.
The principal was to be paid to them in equal shares "when" the
youngest grandchild attained the age of twenty-five. There was a
further provision that if any grandchild should die leaving issue,
his share would go to his issue. In holding that the gift did not
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities the court stated: "No grandchild could be born to the testator later than the time when the
survivor of his son or daughter died, with a possible addition of
nine months representing the period of gestation, and consequently
the class would necessarily close at that time."' 2
Applying the rationale of Hill to the principal case, it would
be impossible for grandchildren to be born more than a nine months
period of gestation after the death of the testator's son whose life
can be taken as the measuring life. The class would close at that
time, and any interest which vested within the period in which
grandchildren could be born would not violate the Rule Against
3
Perpetuities.1
The second problem would be whether the gifts to the grandchildren would vest within the period prescribed by the rule. It is
" 131 Conn. 174, 38 A.2d 604 (1944).
22 Id. at 177, 38 A.2d at 606.
While the court appears to have assumed
that the postponement of enjoyment was valid, the issue was not raised in
the case.
2 See id. at 177, 38 A.2d 607.
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generally held that where a trust gives all or a part of the income
to the beneficiary, with directions to the trustee to divide and deliver
the estate at a stated time in the future, the interest in the estate
vests immediately upon the death of the testator. 14 Conversely,
where there is no gift of the income or the estate distinct from the
division which is to be made equally between all the children upon
the termination of the trust, the "when" of the division marks the
time of the vesting. 5 In applying the latter rule to the facts of the
Parker case the court stated: "[T]here is no bequest of the income
to the class as a whole or to any individual in the class, nor is there
any gift of the corpus apart from the provision for conveyance
per stirpes when the trust has terminated."' 0 In making this statement the court was apparently relying on the rule that a gift of
income must be in specified amounts in order to cause the age
contingency to apply to the payment of the gift rather than to its
vesting. 7 However, the court could have reached an opposite
result by applying the rule that a discretionary trust for the maintenance of a class is effective to vest the otherwise contingent gift.' 8
While the problem of the vesting of the corpus of a discretionary
trust for the maintenance of a class apparently has not arisen in
North Carolina, it has been held that a discretionary gift of income
is effective to cause the immediate vesting of the corpus in the
individual beneficiary. In Jackson v. Langley' 9 property was willed
"'Jackson v. Langley, 234 N.C. 243, 66 S.E.2d 899 (1951); Carter v.

Kempton, 233 N.C. 1, 62 S.E.2d 713 (1950); Sutton v. Quinerly, 228 N.C.
106, 44 S.E.2d 521 (1947); Robinson v. Robinson, 227 N.C. 155, 41 S.E.2d
282 (1947) ; Chas. W. Priddy & Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N.C. 422, 20 S.E.2d
341 (1942); Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 9 S.E.2d 420 (1940);
Weill v. Weill, 212 N.C. 764, 194 S.E.2d 243 (1938).

" Knox v. Knox, 208 N.C. 141, 179 S.E. 610 (1935); Bowen v. Hackney, 136 N.C. 187, 48 S.E. 633 (1904); Fuller v. Fuller, 58 N.C. 223
(1859); Anderson v. Felton, 36 N.C. 55 (1840).
10252

N.C. at 407, 113 S.E.2d at 905.

Paterson Say. Inst. v. De Gray, 136 N.J. Eq. 371, 42 A.2d 264 (Ct. Ch.
1945); In re Helme's Estate, 95 N.J. Eq. 197, 123 Atl. 43 (Prerogative Ct.
1923); In re Mervin, [1891] 3 Ch. 197; In re Parker, 16 Ch. D. 44 (1879);

Lloyd v. Lloyd, 3 K. & J. 20, 69 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch. 1856).

" Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Dignan, 105 N.J. Eq. 750, 146 AtI. 466
(Ct. Ch. 1929); Hayes v. Robeson, 29 R.I. 216, 69 Atl. 686 (1908); In re

Williams, [1907] 1 Ch. 180; Fox v. Fox, L.R. 19 Eq. 286 (1875); Harri-

son v. Grimwood, 12 Beav. 192, 50 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Ch. 1849). The court
also found that the language of the will indicated an intent on the part of the

testator to postpone the vesting of the estate until the youngest child reached
-twenty-one. It would appear unlikely, however, that the testator would have
preferred the whole gift to fail rather than be partially effective.
1234

N.C. 243, 66 S.E.2d 889 (1951).
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to a trustee with directions that the net income be applied to the
support and education of the testatrix's son. It was further provided that "when" the beneficiary reached the age of twenty-five all
the property or the remainder thereof was to vest absolutely in him.
In the event certain enumerated emergencies arose the trustee could
use the income from or the corpus of the trust estate for his own
benefit. The court held that the vesting of the estate in the son was
not in any way affected or delayed to any greater extent than if the
trustee had been given a life estate with the power to use any part
of the corpus for his own benefit. The court stated:
The overwhelming weight of authority, including our
own decisions, supports the view that in such cases the estate
vests in the ultimate beneficiary upon the death of the testator,
subject to be divested of such portion thereof as may be required to meet the authorized needs of the life tenant or other
designated person.20
This decision would seem to support the view that in the Parker
case the corpus would vest in the children in esse at the death of the
testator, subject to partial divestment in favor of after born children
or subject to total divestment in the event of death. 2 '
If it is assumed that there is an immediate vesting of the estate
in the children in esse at the testator's death, subject to divestment,
the question arises whether the possibility that such divestment
might take place at a time beyond the permissible period would
invoke the rule. The court in the principal case cited what is
supposedly a split of authority on this problem, first citing authority
for the proposition that a vested gift, though subject to a condition
subsequent, does not come within the rule.2 2 The court then cited
authority for the view that an executory interest is not vested until
the time comes for taking possession.23 As the latter view would
0
Id. at 246, 66 S.E.2d at 901. See In re Sessions Estate, 217 Ore. 340,
2

341 P.2d 512 (1958), where property was left in trust for A, who was
unborn at the time. The trustee was given discretionary power to apply
the income for A's benefit. The corpus was to go to A "when he shall
reach 25." The court held that the estate was vested, subject to divestment.
"1See Pearson v. Dolman, L.R. 3 Eq. 315 (1866), and Scotney v. Lomer,
31 Ch. D. 380 (1883), holding that the fact that the gift of income is
defeasible does not prevent the gift from causing the immediate vesting of
the interests.
22 Shoemaker v. Newman, 65 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1933) ; In re Friday's
Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 170 Adt. 123 (1933). Compare Congregational Church
Bldg. Soc. v. Everett, 85 Md. 79, 36 Atl. 654 (1897).
" 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
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merely invalidate the executory interest of the issue and not effect
the interest of the grandchildren, it is questionable whether it is
really converse.24 Nevertheless, the court could have preserved the
present gift by adopting the former authority.2"
The third question confronting the court would be whether the
gifts to the issue of any deceased grandchild were valid and if not,
what effect, if any, this would have on the gifts to the grandchildren.
The court in the principal case stated in a dictum that if the interests
did vest at the time of the testator's death, they would be subject
to divestment should any of the beneficiaries die before the termination of the trust. The issue of those so dying would take as purchasers under the will.2 6 The court did not, however, attempt to
pass on the validity of the gifts to the issue. The general rule is
that gifts to the issue of grandchildren born after the testator's death
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities and are, therefore, void.27
However, as the gifts to the issue of grandchildren born before the
testator's death will vest at the death of their parents, and as their
parents were lives in being at the time of the testator's death, these
gifts do not violate the rule.2"
Since the gift to the issue of those grandchildren born after the
death of the testator is void, the question arises whether this would
invalidate the gift to the other classes. The prevailing rule is that
even though the gift to one class in a group of classes is void, this
does not invalidate the gift to the remaining classes.29
In summary, the court might have saved the gift in the principal
case by holding: (1) that the class of grandchildren would close
no later than a nine months period of gestation after the death of
the testator's son and the membership of the class would be determined at that time; (2) that the discretionary gift of income
would cause the immediate vesting of the estate in the grandchildren
The interest of the grandchildren would actually be made indefeasible
by the invalidation of the divesting contingency.
" See note 21 supra.
26 252 N.C. at 405, 113 S.E.2d at 903 (1960).
" Lamkin v. Hines Lumber Co., 158 Ga. 785, 124 S.E. 694 (1924);
Bowerman v. Taylor, 126 Md. 203, 94 Atl. 652 (1915) ; Hill v. Simmons, 125
Mass. 536 (1878).
28 Shepard v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 106 Conn. 627, 138 Atl.
809 (1927); Turner v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 148 Md. 372, 129 Atl.
294 (1925); Dorr v. Lovering, 147 Mass. 530, 18 N.E. 412 (1888).
29 Bowerman v. Taylor, 126 Md. 203, 94 Atl. 652 (1915); Hill v. Simmons, 125 Mass. 536 (1878) ; Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare. 372, 68 Eng. Rep.
1319 (Eq. 1853).
2
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in esse at the testator's death; (3) that the gift to the issue of the
grandchildren born before the testator's death would be valid as
their parents were lives in being at the testator's death; and (4) that
although the gift to the issue of those grandchildren born after the
testator's death would be void, this would not invalidate the gifts
to the other classes.
Various attempts have been made to abolish the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities either by judicial ° or legislative3 ' action.
Although some of these statutes were ill-fated, there seems to be
a present tendency to adopt laws which eliminate some of the harsh
effects of the rule. 33 While these statutes employ varied language,
they are basically consistent. In eight states34 the statutes apply to
both real and personal property. In six states35 they apply to both
equitable and legal interest. In five states30 they provide that the
period of the rule should be measured by actual rather than possible
events. In four states 37 they apply the principle of cy pres.
The Vermont statute3 8 is applicable to both personalty and realty
"0Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101
(1934), applied the rule on the basis of facts which actually did occur, not
those which might have occurred. Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 Ati.
900 (1891), avoided the rule by applying the principle of cy pres to the
will81in question.
E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §§381.215 -.223 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, § 501 (1959).
3 Connecticut, Indiana, Ohio and Wyoming repealed their statutes.
This, according to Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's
Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. Rnv. 721 (1952), was due to the fact that
they were "hopelessly vague."
"E.g., Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §45-95 (1958); Kentucky:
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 381.215 -.223 (1960); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.
160, § 27 (Supp. 1959) ; Maryland: Mi. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 197A (1960) ;
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 1 (1955); New York:
N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1960, ch. 448; Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 301.4(b) (1950) ; Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1959) ; Washi1gton: WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.050 (Supp. 1959).
" Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania and Vermont.
Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts and Vermont.
"Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Washington. Connecticut, Maine and Massachusetts measure the periods of the rule by actual
events
only if the interest is to take place after lives in being.
"7 Kentucky, New York, Vermont and Washington.
"The Vermont statute reads in part: "Any interest in real or personal
property which would violate the rule against perpetuities shall be reformed,
within the limits of the rule, to approximate most closely the intention of
the creator of the interest. In determining whether an interest would violate
said rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall be
measured by actual rather than by possible events." VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, § 501 (1959).
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and incorporates both the doctrine of cy pres and the policy of measuring the period of the rule by actual rather than possible events.
It is submitted that the North Carolina legislature should adopt
such a statute. 9
JERRY W. AmOS
s Until such a statute is adopted by the legislature, the lawyer drawing
a will in North Carolina would be well advised to see the saving clause suggested in Leach & Logan, Perpetuities:A Standard Saving Clause to Avoid
Violations of the Rule, 74 HARv. L. Rnv. 1141 (1961).

